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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
Ho. 90-7099 





On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of Columbia 
BRIEF OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION AS AMICUS CURIAE 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the agency 
charged by Congress with the interpretation, administration, and 
enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e tl ~, and other federal statutes 
prohibiting employment discrimination. This appeal presents 
important issues involving a defendant's burden of proof after a 
plaintiff has proven that an employment decision was based in 
part on sexual stereotypes as well as a district court's 
authority, under Title VII, to order a partnership to make a 






















issues will affect the Commission's enforcement of Title VII and 
other fair employment statutes, we offer our views to the Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court correctly held that, in order 
to prove that it would have made the same decision to "hold" 
Hopkins• partnership candidacy in the absence of sex 
discrimination, Price Waterhouse had to show that the critical 
comments it relied on were not based on the sexual stereotyping 
which infected its decision-making process. 
2. Whether the district court correctly held that, under 
the doctrine of law of the case, it was bound by this Court's 
earlier holding that Hopkins was constructively discharged when 
she was not reproposed for partnership. 
3. Whether the district court correctly held that Title VII 
gives it the authority to order a partnership to admit to its 
ranks a qualified candidate who would have been admitted by the 
partnership but for her sex. 
PERTINENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
All applicable statutes are contained in the Brief of 
Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal from a final 





















STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural History 
The procedural history of this case is fully and accurately 
set out in Appellee•s brief. 
B. statement of the Facts 
In 1982, Ann Hopkins was proposed for partnership in Price 
Waterhouse by the unit of the firm for which she worked. Slip 
op. at 5. She was the only woman among the 88 candidates for 
partnership considered that year . .I.sL. at 6. By July 1984, only 
seven of the firm's 662 partners were women • .I.sL. As part of 
the decision-making process, the firm solicited comments from 
partners about Hopkins' suitability • .I.sL. at 5. 
The comments about Hopkins' work were uniformly favorable • 
.I.sL. The contract awards she won were often cited, including one 
valued between $34 and $44 million with the Department of State 
which the Senior Partner regarded as a "leading credential" 
enabling the firm to secure additional contracts. Hopkins v. 
Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (O.c. cir. 1987). None of 
the other partnership candidates compared with her in terms of 
successfully procuring business for the firm. Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 618 F. supp. 1109, 1112 (O.o.c. 1985). 
However, a number of partners opposed Hopkins' candidacy 
because of perceived deficiencies in her relations with other 
personnel in the firm. Slip op. at 5. Some of these partners 








skills which were couched in terms of her sex. 1 Others 
criticized her in neutral terms. 2 In addition, some of the 
partners who supported Hopkins' candidacy commented on her 
difficulties getting along with others, some in sex-based terms, 3 
others in neutral terms. 4 None of the partners, however, 
criticized Hopkins ability to get along with clients nor did any 
of her clients express any displeasure with her personally or 
professionally. 618 F. Supp. at 1112. They "appear to have been 











1 For example, one pariner noted that "she may have 
overcompensated for being a woman," 618 F.Supp. at 1115, while 
another commented that she needs a "course in charm school,"~ 
at 1116. 
2 For example, one detractor said Hopkins is "universally 
disliked," Hopkins v, Price Waterhouse, 109 u.s. 1775, 1783 
{1988), and another said she is "consistently annoying and 
irritating." I.sL. 
3 For example, partners were critical of her use of 
profanity "because its a lady using foul language," 618 F. Supp. 
at 1116, another supporter said that she initially gives the 
impression of being "macho," .i..!;L_, and a third said that "she had 
matured from a tough-talking, somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. 
to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady 
partner candidate."~ 
4 For example, in Dr. Fiske's testimony, she states that 
partners initially supportive of Hopkins' candidacy commented 
that "she is plain rough on people," "the.re is a risk she may 
abuse authority," and that she is "abrasive." Tr. at 555, 558. 
5 Candidate critiques were laced with gender specific 
comments in years previous to Hopkins' candidacy as well. Women 
candidates were regarded "favorably if they maintained their 
femininity while becoming effective managers." 618 F. Supp. at 
1117. Price Waterhouse rejected at least two women candidates 
"because partners believed they were curt, brusque and abrasive, 
acted like 'Ma Barker' or tried to be 'one of the boys.'" I.sL. 
Further, when considering employees as potential partners, one 
partner stated on more than one occasion that he would never 





















After reviewing the partners' comments, the firm's 
Admission's Committee recommended that Hopkins' candidacy be held 
for at least one year. Isl... at 1113. Thomas Beyer, the partner 
who had the responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons 
for the decision, advised her that to improve her chances of 
becoming a partner she should "walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry." Isl... at 1117. When her unit decided 
several months later not to repropose her for partnership, 6 
Hopkins resigned from the firin. lJL.. at 1113. 
Dr. Susan Fiske, an expert on stereotyping within business 
organizations {~ at 1117), testified that there was a high 
degree of probability that the comments couched in sexist terms 
as well as many of those expressed in neutral terms were the 
product of sexual stereotyping. M.i. at 1117-18. Dr. Fiske noted 
that the negative comments phrased in neutral terms related to 
the same perceived deficiency in Hopkins' ability to get along 
with others that was criticized in sex-based terms by some 
partners {tr. at 558), and that a number of the facially neutral 
believe that women should hold top managerial positions at Price 
Waterhouse • .I9..:_ This partner's comments were neither corrected 
nor discouraged by the firm. ~ 
6 The court found that the decision not to repropose 
Hopkins was a result of the decision by two partners in her 
division who had supported her partnership the first time not to 
support it any longer. 825 F.2d at 463. The partners' change in 
position was due in part, the court found, to Hopkins' 
misrepresentation of statements by the chairman of the firm in an 






















comments, even some by partners who had very little contact with 
Hopkins, were so intensely negative that they indicated reliance 
on stereotypes. 825 F.2d at 467. According to Dr. Fiske, the 
probability that sexual stereotypes infected the partnership 
decision-making process was also indicated by the following 
factors: that Hopkins was the only woman among the candidates for 
partnership (.isLJ; that the criteria used were inherently 
ambiguous(~); that many of the comments were essentially 
advising Hopkins to behave more like a woman and less like a man 
(tr. at 554); and that Price Waterhouse did not disavow even the 
most extreme comments. 618 F. Supp. at 1119. 
In its initial decision, the district court found that 
sexual stereotyping infected Price Waterhouse's consideration of 
Hopkins• candidacy for partnership. ~ at 1120. Judge Gesell 
found that, although there was a basis for legitimate concern 
about Hopkins' problems dealing with staff, it was also evident 
that some of the criticisms were the product of stereotypes. ~ 
Because Price Waterhouse failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that it would have made the same decision if sexual 
stereotypes had not been used in evaluating Hopkins, the court 
held that she was entitled to retrospective relief. However, 
because it found that Hopkins was not constructively discharged 
and that the decision not to repropose her for partnership was 
6 
not discriminatory, the court held that she was not entitled to 
an order directing the firm to make her a partner.
7 
This Court affirmed the finding that Price Waterhouse 
violated Title VII and agreed with the district court that 
retrospective relief was appropriate because the firm failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made 
the same decision absent discrimination. 825 F.2d at 472. This 
Court, however, reversed the district court's holding that 
Hopkins was not constructively discharged because, in its view, 
the firm's failure to renominate Hopkins as partner was a 
"career-ending action." .IsL. at 473. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' finding that 
sexual stereotyping played a role in the decision not to grant 
•] Hopkins a partnership.





Court held that Price Waterhouse could avoid liability, not just 
retrospective relief, if it could prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have made the same decision if Hopkins' 
sex had not been a factor. 109 s.ct. at 1795. Since the 
district court had applied a more stringent evidentiary standard, 
the Court remanded the case for further proceedings . .IsL_ 
Without opinion, this Court then vacated the district court's 
7 The court also denied all backpay because Hopkins, 
operating under a stipulation which had not been approved by the 
court, failed to introduce evidence of her lost wages during the 
trial on liability. 
8 The Court noted that Price Waterhouse did not seek review 






















"judgment" as well as its own 1987 "mandate" and remanded the 
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with the supreme Court decision. 
c. District court Decision 
On remand, Price Waterhouse declined the district court's 
invitation to present more evidence on the question of 
liability, 9 arguing instead that the evidence already in the 
record established that it would not have granted Hopkins a 
partnership even if her sex had not been a factor in the 
decision. Slip op. at 10-11. The district court disagreed, 
noting that Price Waterhouse failed to present evidence enabling 
the court to "separate out those comments tainted by sexism from 
those free of sexism for purposes of demonstrating that non-
discriminatory factors alone justified the hold decision." .Ig__,._ 
at 10. Therefore, the court concluded that the firm failed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made 
the same decision if Hopkins' sex had not been a factor in its 
decision not to make her a partner . .Ig__,._ at 11. Since this 
Court's decision that Hopkins was constructively discharged was 
not challenged in the Supreme Court and was "analytically 
unrelated to the decision on liability" which was the focus of 
the supreme Court's review, the district court concluded that it 
constituted the law of the case and, therefore, declined to 
reconsider the issue. ~ at 12. 
9 Both parties presented evidence on the issue of back pay. 
8 
-
• 1 · ,. 


















Finding that the alternative of front pay would not make 
Hopkins whole for the loss she suffered as a result of Price 
Waterhouse's discriminatory conduct, the court ordered Price 
Waterhouse to admit Hopkins as a partner in its firm. ~ at 19. 
The court noted that the firm's suggestion that it should merely 
be ordered to reconsider Hopkins' candidacy #ould reEult in an 
order that is "futile and unjust" because it was clear from the 
evidence that they would not voluntarily admit her to the 
partnership. ~ The court also awarded Hopkins backpay, 
discounted substantially because of her failure to mitigate, and 
attorney's fees. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Price Waterhouse argued below and argues again on appeal 
that it proved that Hopkins would not have been made a partner in 
the absence of sex discrimination by relying on the negative 
comments about her interpersonal relations which were not couched 
in sex-based terminology. The district court was correct, 
however, in holding that this was not an adequate response in 
light of the evidence that sexual stereotyping permeated Price 
Waterhouse's partnership evaluation process, infecting not only 
those negative comments that were couched in sexist terms but 
also some of those which were stated in neutral terms. 
The Supreme Court's decision in this case makes it plain 
that it was Price Waterhouse which bore the burden of separating 
the discriminatory criticisms from the non-discriminatory ones 
and the concomitant risk that they cannot be separated. On 
9 
~ i ,, . 
- I 
' -' ] 
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remand, Price Waterhouse made no attempt to do so. Accordingly 
the district court correctly found that Price Waterhouse would 
have made Ann Hopkins a partner but for her sex and that, 
therefore, its failure to award her a partnership violated Title 
VII. 
2. Price Waterhouse argues that the district court should 
have reconsidered this Court's earlier determination that Hopkins 
was constructively discharged. Since the legal principles and 
the evidence relevant to the question of constructive discharge 
have not changed since Price Waterhouse originally argued this 
issue before this Court, the district court correctly held that 
it was bound under the doctrine of law of the case by this 
Court's holding. 
Price Waterhouse argues that because Hopkins was responsible 
for not being reproposed as a partnership candidate in 1983, it 
would work a grave injustice to award her partnership. However, 
this argument misses the point. The issue of constructive 
discharge is reached only after this Court affirms the finding 
that Hopkins would have been a partner in 1982 absent sex 
discrimination. If Price Waterhouse had acted legally in 1982, 
the events which took place in 1983 would not have occurred. 
Consequently, the district court's decision, which places Hopkins 
in the position she would have been in 1982 absent illegal 
conduct, is equitable. 
3. Price Waterhouse argues that the district court was 
powerless to order it to grant partnership to Hopkins despite its 
j . 
10 




















finding that she would have been made a partner in the firm but 
for her sex. To the contrary, the court's order was within the 
broad remedial discretion granted to the district courts in 
§ 706(g) of Title VII and was necessary to accomplish one of the 
overriding purposes of Title VII relief placing discrimination 
victims in the position they would have been in but for the 
discrimination. Contrary to Price Waterhouse's contention, the 
order that Hopkins be made a partner was within the court's 
authority under Title VII even if partners at Price Waterhouse 
are not employees for purposes of Title VII. This Court and the 
Supreme Court have held that§ lO(c) of the National Labor 
Relations Act, the provision from which§ 706(g) was derived, 
authorizes the NLRB to order an employer to place an individual 
in a position which is not covered by that statute. There is no 
reason why the same result should not obtain under Title VII . 
Price Waterhouse also argues that a court order compelling 
it to make an individual a partner interferes with its right to 
be the sole determiners of who joins its ranks. We agree that 
courts should always be wary of substituting their judgments of 
an individual's suitability for that of the employer, 
particularly where subjective factors are involved. However, 
once the district court determined after careful consideration 
that Hopkins would have been made a partner but for her sex, it 
properly did not hesitate to order that she be made a partner as 




I. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN THE SAME 
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO HOPKINS' CANDIDACY IN THE ABSENCE OF 
DISCRIMINATION, BECAUSE IT DID NOT SHOW THAT THE NEGATIVE 
COMMENTS ABOUT PLAINTIFF'S PERSONALITY UPON WHICH IT RELIES 
WERE NOT BASED ON SEXUAL STEREOTYPES 
On remand, the district court was faced with a record 
containing evidence that both legal and illegal motives 
influenced Price Waterhouse's decision not to award a partnership 
to Ann Hopkins. The Supreme Court made it clear that Price 
Waterhouse bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that its decision would have been the same if it acted 
based only on the legal motives and that the firm thus bore "'the 
risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be 
separated.'" Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 109 s. ct. at 1790, 
quoting NLRB v. Transportation Management corp,, 462 u.s. 393, 
403 (1983). 
Price Waterhouse argued below and argues again on appeal 
that it carried its burden of proof by relying on those negative 
comments about Hopkins' interpersonal relations which were not 








correct, however, in holding that this was not an adequate 
response in light of the evidence that sexual stereotyping 
permeated the evaluation process, affecting not only those 
criticisms that were overtly sexist but also some that were 
couched in neutral terms. Op. at 8-9. 
It is by now established that "Price Waterhouse's 
partnership evaluation system was infected by impermissible, 
12 
....- . 


























sexually stereotyped attitudes toward women." 825 F.2d at 465. 
Although Price Waterhouse does not dispute this fact, it 
trivializes it by acting as if the only thing wrong with its 
consideration of Hopkins• candidacy was the existence of a few 
negative comments couched in sexist terms. This is far from the 
case. In establishing that Price Waterhouse's consideration of 
her candidacy for partnership was tainted by sex discrimination, 
Hopkins did not simply show that she was the object of the 
several overtly sexist statements that the firm now seeks to put 
to one side. She demonstrated that, particularly with respect to 
personality traits, she was judged by a different standard than 
male partnership candidates. Although the most blatant evidence 
of this double standard were the sex-based criticisms of some 
partners, there was considerable evidence that the same 
criticisms made by other partners in sex-neutral terms were 
likely the result of the same stereotyping. 10 
Although the existence of this double standard was apparent 
from the treatment of Hopkins' candidacy, Hopkins offered, as 
"icing on the cake'' (Hopkins, 109 s.ct. at 1793), the testimony 
of Dr. Susan Fiske, an expert on stereotyping within business 
















organizations, who explained why there was a high degree of 
probability that some of the negative comments about Hopkins' 
personality that were expressed in neutral terms as well as those 
expressed in sex-based terms were the product of sexual 
stereotyping. According to Dr. Fiske, in an organization like 
Price Waterhouse where assertiveness and independence are 
generally considered necessary attributes of a successful 
partner, a woman subject to stereotypic standards is placed in a 
no-win situation. If she acts in accordance with stereotypic 
expectations by being understanding, tender and soft, she is not 
viewed as an effective and formidable manager. But, if she 
behaves in a way that is counter to those expectations, by being 
ambitious, competitive and independent, as Ann Hopkins did, she 
is viewed as having personality problems. Tr. at 547. 
Despite the evidence that this double standard permeated the 
consideration of Hopkins' candidacy for partnership, Price 
Waterhouse asked the district court, and now asks this Court, to 
accept at face value criticisms of Hopkins' personality as long 
as they were not overtly sex-based. We agree with the district 
court that Price Waterhouse could not rely on the facially 
neutral criticisms of Hopkins' personality without providing some 
evidence that their authors were judging Hopkins by the same 
standards that they would apply to a male candidate. As the 
district court noted, the firm could have presented testimony by 
the partners making the comments "for appraisal of the 




have presented expert testimony challenging Dr. Fiske's assertion 
that the neutral comments were probably the product of sexual 
stereotypes. Op. at 9. Having failed to do either, Price 
Waterhouse cannot persuasively argue that it carried its burden 
ot proof on remand and the district court's finding of liability 
should be affirmed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THIS COURT'S EARLIER HOLDING THAT HOPKINS WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED IS THE LAW OF THE CASE 
The last time this case was appealed to this Court, Hopkins 
challenged the district court's finding that she had not been 
constructively discharged. After careful consideration, this 
Court held that Hopkins had been constructively discharged. The 
district court correctly rebuffed Price Waterhouse's effort to 
relitigate the issue. Under the doctrine of law of the case, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court 
bind all subsequent proceedings in the same case, absent 
exceptional circumstances. Arizona v. California. 460 u.s. 605, 
618 (1983). This doctrine embodies several fundamental concerns 
in the administration of justice. It is crucial in helping to 
put an end to litigation over a particular issue (Laffey v. 1 
J Northwest Airlines. Inc,, 642 F.2d 578, 585 co.c. cir. 1980)); it 
1 also serves to discourage "panel shopping." United States Office 
of Personnel Management, v, FLRA. No. 88-1901 (D.C. cir. June 15, 
J 1990) (quoting Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 662 (5th 
Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1976)). Accordingly, 1 





only be convinced that its earlier decision was erroneous: it 
must also be satisfied that adherence to the law of the case will 
work a grave injustice." Laffey. 642 F.2d at 585. Price 
Waterhouse's arguments fall far short of this standard. 
Much ot the firm's argument ignores the facts of the case. 
The issue of constructive discharge is only relevant if this 
Court affirms the district court's finding that Price Waterhouse 
would have made Hopkins a partner in 1982 but for the fact that 
she was a woman. Although Hopkins• own conduct caused the firm 
to decide not to reconsider her for partnership in 1983, she 
would already have been a partner if the firm had acted legally 
in considering her candidacy several months earlier. There is 
nothing inequitable in requiring the firm to make her whole for 
its earlier illegal conduct without reconsidering whether her 
later decision to leave the firm was voluntary or a constructive 
discharge. 11 
11 Although it is unnecessary for the court to address the issue in light of the finding that Hopkins was constructively discharged, it is far from clear that she would have been ineligible for an award of a partnership even if it were found that she had left her job as an associate voluntarily. In ruling in his initial decision that Hopkins could not be awarded a partnership because she had not been con~ructively discharged from her job as an associate, Judge Gesell relied on dicta in this court's decision in Clark y, Marsh. 665 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (D.c.cir. 1981). Hopkins, 618 F. supp. at 1121. In Clark, this Court stated that a Title VII plaintiff's entitlement to an award of the promotion she was discriminatorily denied and backpay past the date of her retirement "must rest upon proof that she •was not the responsible agent in [her) own termination.'" 665 F.2d at 1112 (quoting Williams y. Boorstin. 663 F.2d 109, 119 (D.c. Cir. 1980). But Williams involved a plaintiff's request that he be reinstated to~~ ,i2l2 that he had lost due to his own actions. It would be relevant if Hopkins were seeking reinstatement to her job as an associate after she voluntarily 
16 
) . 
The district court correctly rejected Price Waterhouse's 
argument that the appellate decision on this issue was vitiated 
when this Court vacated its "mandate" after the Supreme Court's 
decision. Although, as a technical matter, this court uses the 
term mandate to refer to its judgment and its opinion, that is 
not dispositive in applying the flexible doctrine of law of the 
case. It is much more significant that there has been no change 
in the law or the facts since Price Waterhouse originally argued 
the issue before this court. ~ Fadhl Y, City and County of San 
Francisco. 804 F.2d 1097 (9th cir. 1986) (law of the case 
prohibits an appellate court from reexamining the sufficiency of 
the evidence in a sex discrimination case when the court had 
before it all the evidence when it first reviewed the case); and 
Webster y, sun co,, Inc., 790 F.2d 157 co.c. cir. 1986) (absent 
clear change in governing law, an appellate court must follow law 
I of the case set down in opinion of earlier panel). All of the 
I 
I 
evidence on which the firm relies to make its constructive 
discharge argument on this appeal was available to the firm on 
the last appeal. And, the law of constructive discharge has 
remained the same since the last appeal. As the district court 
noted, Price Waterhouse did not seek review of the adverse ruling 
on constructive discharge. Because that issue was "analytically 
unrelated to" and "totally distinct" from the issue of liability, 
nothing in the Supreme Court's decision affects its legal 
left that job, but we fail to see its relevance to her request 
for the partnership which she was denied due to Price 
Waterhouse's discriminatory action. 
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analysis. Slip op. at 12, 14. In fact, as the district court 
pointed out, the decision from the last appeal has been relied on 
as precedent in numerous decisions in this Circuit12 and none of 
these cases have criticized the constructive discharge ruling or 
its reasoning. Therefore, because there is no new evidence or 
change in the governing law and no manifest injustice would 
result from adhering to the constructive discharge holding, it 
would be contrary to the principles of common sense and judicial 
economy which underlie the doctrine of law of the case to permit 
Price Waterhouse to relitigate the issue. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS AUTHORIZED BY TITLE VII TO AWARD 
PARTNERSHIP TO A QUALIFIED CANDIDATE WHO WOULD HAVE 
BEEN MADE A PARTNER BY THE FIRM BUT FOR HER SEX 
Price Waterhouse argues that the district court was 
powerless to order it to make Ann Hopkins a partner despite its 
finding that she would have been made a partner by the firm but 
for her sex. The firm, however, offers no basis in law or policy 
for such a narrow reading of a court's remedial authority under 
Title VII. On the contrary, as this Court recently reiterated, 
Title VII requires courts to award "the most complete relief 
possible" to victims of discrimination. Lander v, Lujan. 888 
F.2d 153, 156 (D.c. Cir. 1989) (citing Franks v. Bowman 
Transportation co., 424 u.s. 747, 754 (1976)). The overriding 
12 see Katradis v. Dav-El of Washington, o,c., 846 F.2d 
1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Simpson v. Federal Mine Safety & 
Health Review commission. 842 F.2d 453, 462 (D.C. cir. 1988); 
Dashnaw v. Secretary of Transportation. 1989 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 
16480 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1988); Palmer v, Barry, 1988 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17343 (o.o.c. September 30, 1988); DeMarco y, Thomas, 1988 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12315 (O.O.C. April 8, 1988). 
18 
principle of Title VII relief is that, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, discrimination victims should be placed in the 
position they would have been in but for the discrimination. 
The district court found in this case that Hopkins "failed 
to receive partnership at the time she was held over because of 
sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII." Op. at 11. 
Therefore, because an award of partnership is relief specifically 
tailored to the conduct found to have violated the law, it is the 
most efficient and equitable remedy available. 13 
The district court correctly recognized that a front pay • 
j award would not constitute full relief. Hopkins has stated 
t repeatedly that she wants partnership at Price Waterhouse because 
of that firm's unique posture in the business community. A 1 monetary award, therefore, would not constitute complete relief. 
~ Human Relations comm'n v. Thorp. Reed & Armstrong. 361 A.2d I 497, 502 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1976) (benefits accruing from a 
I 
professional career are not measured in dollars alone there is 
also the benefit of prestige in being associated with an 
established firm). Further, as a partner, Hopkins will be 
entitled to shares of the firm's annual earnings. For a court to 
calculate an exact dollar amount for each share and anticipate 





the number of shares she would be entitled to throughout her 
business life would present severe difficulties, which are 
avoided by the court's order that she be made a partner. Op. at 
19. 
I , Contrary to Price Waterhouse's contention, the language of 
I 
j § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g), is broad enough to 
• authorize the relief ordered in this case. Section 706(g) 
provides that, once a Title VII violation is found, a court can 
"order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may 
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of 
employees, with or without backpay, or any other equitable relief 
the court deems appropriate." (Emphasis added). To be sure, as 
Price Waterhouse notes, the maxim eiusdem generis operates to 
limit§ 706(g) 's general words to matters similar to the specific 
terms which follow. The relief ordered by the court in this case 
is closely analogous to the relief which§ 706(g) authorizes in 
cases involving discrimination in promotion to high-level jobs. 
An order requiring reinstatement and backpay is aimed at 
restoring the economic status quo that would have been attained 
but for the discrimination. Franks, 424 u.s. at 764. The 
district court's award of partnership to Hopkins achieves the 
same result in a similar context and is, therefore, relief of the 
general kind, class or nature as the remedies identified in 
§ 706 (g) • 
Price Waterhouse also argues that an order that Hopkins be 















Title VII action because partners are not employee
s covered by 
Title VII. Even assuming that partners in Price W
aterhouse are 
not employees, 1
4 courts, including this court and the Supreme 
Court, have rejected the same argument in the context
 of§ l0(c) 
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 u.s
.c. § 160(c), 
the provision upon which§ 706(g) of Title VII was
 based. 15 In 
Golden Gate State Bottling Co, y. NLRB~ 414 U.S. 168, 188 (197
3), 
the Supreme Court held that, when necessary to rem
edy a violation 
of the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board wa
s authorized by 
§ l0(c) to order an employer to hire a former empl
oyee as an 
independent contractor, notwithstanding the fact t
hat independent 
contractors are not covered employees under the NL
RA. That 
holding w~s followed in Oil, Chemical and Atomic W
orkers Int'l 
Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB. 547 F.2d 575, 589 (D.C. C
ir. 1976), where 
this Court held that a former non-supervisory empl
oyee should be 
reinstated and promoted to a supervisory position 
despite the 
fact that supervisors are not covered employees un
der the NLRA. 
14 Price Waterhouse assumes that its partners are not
 
employees under Title VII because they have an own
ership interest 
in the firm. However, the positions of partner an
d employee are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. "There is not
hing inherently 
inconsistent between the co-existence of .a proprie
tary and an 
employment relationship." Goldberg v. Whitaker Ho
use 
Cooperative. Inc,, 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961) (shareho
lders in 
knitwear cooperative held to be employees under th
e FLSA). 
Although the court does not reach the issue in thi
s case, the 
Commission takes the position that whether a partn
er is an 
employee depends on the particular circumstances o
f the 
individual's relation with the partnership. EEOC 
Decision No. 
85-4, Emp. Prac. Guide {CCH) 1 6840 at 7040, 7041 n.4, 37 
FEP 
cases 1885 (March 18, 1984). 
15 
(1982). 







~~,NLRB Y, Bell Aircraft Corp,. 206 F.2d 235, 236-37 (2d 
cir. 1953). As the court stated in Bell Aircraft, 
At the time the discrimination took place, [the 
employee) was clearly a protected employee, and his 
prospects for promotion were among the conditions of 
his employment. The [NLRA) protected him so long as he 
held a nonsupervisory position, and it is immaterial 
that the protection thereby afforded was calculated to 
enable him to obtain a position in which he would no 
longer be protected. 
206 F.2d at 236-37. In Hishon Y, King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 
(1983), the supreme court held that, whether or not partners are 
employees for purposes of Title VII, advancement to partnership 
is a privilege of an associate's employment which must be awarded 
on a non-discriminatory basis. S,ll ~ Hopkins, 109 u.s. at 
1781 n.l. Although the Hishon court did not decide whether a 
court could order partnership when promotion to partnership is 
discriminatorily denied, there is nothing in Hishon which 
suggests that a court finding such a violation should not follow 
the practice the Supreme Court has approved under the NLR~ and 
award make whole relief even if it means that the individual will 
be placed in a position which is itself not covered by Title VII. 
Price Waterhouse's argument that partnership should not be 
awarded because of the special nature of ~he partnership 
relationship (see Br. at 30) is similar to the argument made by 
colleges and universities that tenure should never be awarded as 
a Title VII remedy. In both cases, there is a valid argument 
that courts should be cautious to avoid substituting their 
judgment for the opinions of the partners and faculty members 
entrusted with deciding who should attain partnership or tenure. 
22 
Also, in both cases, where, after careful c
onsideration, a court 
determines that a qualified individual was 
denied a partnership 
or tenure because of race, sex, national or
igin or religion, it 
should not hesitate to order make whole rel
ief including an award 
of the status that was illegally denied. ~
 Brown y. Trustees 
of Boston university, 891 F.2d 337 (1st cir. 1990) (a
ffirming 
award of tenure as remedy for sex discrimina
tion in denial of 
tenure), cert. denied, 58 u.s.L.W. 3796 (Ju
ne 18, 1990); Kunda v. 
Muhlenberg college, 621 F.2d 532 .(3d cir. 1
980) (affirming grant 
of tenure); and Ford v. Nicks, 741 F.2d 858
 (6th cir. 1984) 
(affirming order of reinstatement with tenu
re). 
Price Waterhouse's argument that the award 
of partnership to 
Hopkins implicates its right to freedom of 
association under the 
First Amendment is simply a rehash of the a
rgument rejected by 
the Supreme Court in Hishon. As the Court 
noted in that case, 
"'[i)nvidious private discrimination may be
 characterized as a 
form of exercising freedom of association p
rotected by the First 
Amendment, but it has never been accorded a
ffirmative 
constitutional protections."' Hishon, 109 
U.S. at 2235, quoting 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 u.s. 455, 470 (1?7
3). Just as Price 
Waterhouse could not hide behind the doctri
ne of freedom of 
association to avoid liability for denying 
Ann Hopkins 
partnership because of her sex in 1982, it 
cannot use freedom of 
association as an excuse for failing to aff
ord her rightful place 
in the partnership today. 
23 
Price Waterhouse also argues that, even if the court had the 
authority to award partnership, it abused its discretion in 
awarding one in this case because of Hopkins' admitted 
personality problems. Once again, the firm's argument ignores 
the finding of the district court that Hopkins' behavior would 
not have prevented her from obtaining partnership if she had been 
a man. Given this finding, which is well supported by the 
evidence, there is no basis for arguing that her admission to the 
firm at this time was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the 
district court's order that Price Waterhouse admit Ann Hopkins as 
a partner in the firm should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment 
should be affirmed. 
24 
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